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Abstract: Act 16/2003 for the Quality of the Spanish Health System 
was modified on April 2012 by the Royal Decree-Act 16/2012 with the 
aim of guaranteeing the sustainability of the National Health System and 
improving the quality and security of health benefits. One of the chang-
es in the new text restricts access to regular healthcare for immigrants 
without health card. The rationale of this decision is that in order to 
ensure the continuity of the health system it is necessary to rationalise 
health expenditure. In this case, such optimisation has meant an important 
restriction in health access by a part of the population living in Spain, 
particularly affecting groups with high levels of social vulnerability and 
precariousness. We suspect that the only criterion applied to such modi-
fication of Act 16/2013 is the cost-benefit one. We wonder whether 
rationalizing the distribution of a public good as health is, can only be 
done through the application of a cost-benefit analysis. Our purpose is to 
reflect on the possibilities and limitations of the utilitarian criterion to 
guarantee compliance with the aims of medicine and to introduce the 
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deliberative procedure, from the approach of critical hermeneutics, as a 
rational criterion able to overcome the deficiencies of the utilitarian pers-
pective.
Keywords: Health System, Bioethics, Utilitarism, Deliberation, Vul-
nerability.
INTRODUCTION
One evening, at the bioethics class, we were debating about the fairness 
of several healthcare models. We discussed the historical interpretations 
that the right to healthcare has had, when a student posed the following 
question to us:
“I am a pensioner. I have contributed to social security during all my life. 
Let’s imagine that one day I find myself in a serious health condition because 
of a very rare disease leading me to an emergency service. Let’s also imagine 
that in this same moment there was an immigrant in the same situation and 
that the hospital was able to treat only one of us. Who should the hospital care 
for, the immigrant or myself, who has paid my social contributions all my life?”
This question started a long debate that included all kinds of. Among 
them, health as a universal human right that must be guaranteed by the 
State was not given for granted. It seems, on the contrary, that the idea 
that only people who have done something are entitled to healthcare is 
slowly permeating society.
It is undeniable that the provision of basic rights and opportunities such 
as health and education has a cost for governments, but we cannot forget 
that the mechanism of tax collection through wages and consumption of 
goods and services is grounded on the collective will to distribute basic 
opportunities to all individuals, and to ensure the prosperity of society as 
a whole. Such distribution is based on the criterion of equality and dig-
nity for all human beings so that every person is able to develop his/her 
life project. Nevertheless, in the present context of economic crisis, such 
will seems to decline in front of an increasing belief that every person is 
the owner of and responsible for his/her capacities, regardless of his/her 
starting point, in the light of a trend that considers economic reasoning as 
the only rational criterion to sustain the distribution of social goods.
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One of Jürgen Habermas best known thesis points out that econom-
ic rationality based on money circulation and exchange as well as the 
maximisation of profits has colonised the field of civil society where in-
dividuals organise themselves to share and acquire non-economic goods 
and where cross-personal relations are built on the basis of solidarity.1 
Social life is growingly being invaded by a trend of private interests, thus 
slowly but gradually undermining some of the foundations of the frater-
nity on which civil society rests.
Taking into account these remarks within the context of the eco-
nomic crisis we are suffering, as well as the numerous reforms and budget-
ary cuts that are being adopted recently, we thought it was appropriate 
to think about two ethical criteria of rationality that may be used as a 
reference for the distribution of a public good as health is; the utilitarian 
criterion and the deliberative one. The former is very close to economic 
rationality, the latter is more linked to democratic rationality. We will 
use as a starting point for our reflection the changes introduced in the 
Spanish Act of Health Provision in relation to the delivery of health 
services to undocumented immigrants.2
CHANGES IN THE REGULATION OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH 
SYSTEM
On the 20th of April 2012, the Spanish government published the 
Royal Decree-Act of urgent measures to guarantee the sustainability of 
the national health system and to improve the quality and reliability of 
its benefits. The key objective of the Royal Decree-Act was to set up a 
number of measures to reduce the annual budget for the Spanish public 
health system by 10%, amounting 7,000,000 euros out of a total budget 
of 65,000,000 Euros. The Royal-Decree Act deals with the following 
aspects: 1) access conditions to healthcare for insured and not-insured 
persons; 2) conditions for pharmaceutical co-payment by adjusting 
1 Habermas, J. (2005). Facticidad y Validez. Sobre el derecho y el Estado 
democrático de derecho en términos de teoría del discurso. Trotta, Madrid.
2 It is important to point out that the Act proposes remarkable changes affecting 
several groups of citizens, such as the long-term unemployed, people with chronic 
diseases and subject to costly treatments and public health system staff. Nevertheless, 
in this article we will only focus on the immigrant’s situation.
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medicines’ cost to personal income; 3) the introduction of changes re-
lated to the labour conditions of public health workers; 4) additional 
measures.3
This new text modifies the Act 16/2003, of 28 of May, for the 
cohesion and quality of the National Health System and also modifies 
the access conditions to the public health system by establishing the 
concepts of “Insured Persons” and “Beneficiaries”. The former are those 
entitled to the provision of healthcare, being: workers, pensioners, 
unemployment beneficiaries and job seekers registered as such. “Ben-
eficiaries” are those who do not meet the requirements to be “Insured 
Persons”, but who are married to such a person or under-26 year old 
sons or daughters of an insured person, are nationals of the European 
Economic Area (EU foreigners) or are third-country persons with a 
residence permit in Spain.
This modification leaves undocumented immigrants out of the system 
losing the possibility to have access to regular healthcare. According to 
the Act, those who are not considered as insured persons will only receive 
medical care in cases of emergency caused by serious disease or accident. 
Assistance to pregnancy, birth, post-birth and when they are under 18 is 
still guaranteed.4 At the beginning, people over 26 who had never con-
tributed to the social security were included within those not insured 
unless declared non-solvent, but this provision was abolished in later 
changes to the Royal Decree-Act.
This decision restricts the access to healthcare for undocumented im-
migrants and introduces an important division between nationals and 
non-nationals and between those working and therefore able to protect 
themselves against diseases and those who, lacking a legally recognised 
job or not working at all, may end up being more vulnerable in relation 
to certain diseases.
3 Real Decreto-ley 16/2012 de 20 de abril, de medidas urgentes para garantizar la 
sostenibilidad del Sistema Nacional de Salud y mejorar la calidad y seguridad de sus 
prestaciones. BOE Nº 98.
4 Some Comunidades Autónomas in Spain, like Cataluña and Andalucía, and some 
others, have approved special provisions to offer medical assistance to undocumented 
immigrants, if they fulfill certain conditions.
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SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE MODIFICATIONS  
OF THE ACT IN RELATION TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
“INSURED PERSONS” AND “NON-INSURED” PERSONS
Regarding the distinction between “insured persons” and “non-in-
sured” persons, the following must be said:
1. This distinction affects the benefits of the fundamental right to 
healthcare for those persons living in Spain who have not legalised 
their administrative situation but pay consumption taxes such as 
VAT. In practical terms, they are excluded on the grounds of their 
origin and therefore the aim that has traditionally made the public 
health service meaningful is hindered. This aim being to provide 
universal health coverage that promotes good health and contributes 
to generating a vigorous, prosperous and happy society. This is 
opposed to human rights (article 25),5 and to all the covenants 
signed by Spain, that recognise the right to be entitled to medical 
care by every person without discrimination.
2. In addition, this restriction for undocumented immigrants only to 
be treated in case of emergency, will worsen pathologies and increase 
costs, as any diagnostic delay will favour the worsening of diseases, 
in some cases becoming chronic. Often this will mean more use of 
hospitals or more aggressive treatments, which ends up with 
higher costs than primary care and in the case of a number of pa-
thologies, also a lower medical efficiency.
3. People suffering from chronic diseases are left uncared for. Immi-
grants with diseases such as HIV, diabetes, blood hypertension, 
cancer or requiring treatments such as dialysis will not be looked 
after, they will face difficulties in being treated, in have access to 
specialists, etc. This situation will bring consequences to public 
health.
In addition to moral considerations and to the health effects, other 
arguments have been used against the alleged reasonability of these mea-
sures, such as:
5 Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos. http://www.un.org/es/docu-
ments/udhr/
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4. Immigrants do not block primary care services. As one recent re-
search paper edited by “La Caixa” which correlates Migration and 
Welfare State6 proves, the use immigrants make of health services 
only amounts to 5% in spite of being 12% of the Spanish popula-
tion, according to the last report by the National Statistics Institute.7 
This study does not show the use of health system according to the 
administrative situation.
5. It is important to distinguish between health tourism and immigra-
tion since they are different issues. The former takes place when 
European Union citizens travel to Spain to benefit from treatments 
that are more difficult to be granted in their countries of origin. 
This is a situation that was regularised in 2011 and that led to new 
agreements between Member States.8 But this is a different case 
than the one of third-country immigrants. A great number of stud-
ies indicate that most immigrants come to Spain for job-related 
reasons and not to take advantage of health services. All studies on 
this subject emphasize that the average age of this population is 32.2 
years and that the majority of immigrants have a good health con-
dition.9
We understand that in a context of an acute economic crisis and with 
a view to guaranteeing its sustainability, the National Public Health 
System seriously plans a rationalisation of the expenses generated by the 
services it provides. Our interest is to analyse the criteria that is being 
used when carrying out such rationalisation. According to the Dictionary 
of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, rationalising means or-
ganising production or labour in such a way that profits increase or costs 
6 Moreno, F.J. y Bruquetas, M. (2011). Inmigración y Estado de Bienestar en 
España, Colección Estudios Sociales, Nº 31, Obra Social “la Caixa”, Barcelona. Gal-
lego, D. (2011). Guía Metodológica. De los tópicos a la realidad. Procedimientos de 
actuación frente a prejuicios relativos a la diversidad de origen. Fundación Cepaim. 
http://cepaim.org/biblioteca/publicaciones-2/
7 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (2010). Notas de prensa, 29/04/2010 y 
28/01/2010. www.ine.es
8 Cf. Directiva 2011/24/UE Del Parlamento Europeo y Del Consejo de 09 de 
marzo de 2011, relativa a la aplicación de los derechos de los pacientes ante la asisten-
cia sanitaria transfronteriza.
9 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2010), Notas de prensa, 29/04/2010 y 
28/01/2010. www.ine.es
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are reduced with the lowest of efforts. Applied to the health area, this 
involves reorganising work in a way that improves the health of the 
population at large or diminishes the costs while keeping the same qual-
ity of care. In any case, the rational criteria will aim at guaranteeing the 
optimal performance of the National Health System and therefore that 
the practice of medicine continues to meet the goals granting its legiti-
macy and purpose.
According to a study by the Hasting Center, these objectives are: 
1) preventing disease and promoting health; 2) alleviating the suffering 
and the pain brought about by diseases; 3) looking after ill persons and 
taking care of those who cannot be cured; 4) avoiding premature death 
and promoting peaceful death.10 Such aims must benefit society at large. 
Nevertheless, the specifications of the Royal Decree-Act in terms of 
“insured and not insured persons” and also regarding pharmaceutical 
coverage –a matter we have not dealt with here– seem to be based on 
a single criterion: cost reduction. This causes a direct harm to un-
documented immigrants and may imply a risk for public health. This 
way of approaching medicine seems to assume as criteria of rationality 
some premises of the possessive individualism and utilitarianism, which 
we will analyse next and that, as we shall see, may prove inadequate 
or insufficient to guarantee a fair and efficient fulfilment of the pur-
poses for which the existence of the National Health System makes 
sense.
INDIVIDUALS, THEIR FREEDOM, THEIR CONCERNS  
AND THEIR HEALTH
The tradition of liberal thought shows great differences to the extent 
that some authors refer to liberalism as a set of traditions with premises 
that have been reformulated with the passing of time.11 For Hobbes and 
Bentham liberalism is one thing and for the egalitarian liberalism upheld 
by contemporary authors such as Rawls and Guttmann, it is quite an-
other. Nevertheless, we think appropriate to recall some of the traits of 
the concept of person featured in the works of liberal authors such as 
10 Hastings Center. (2007). Los fines de la medicina, Fundació Víctor Grífols i 
Lucas, Barcelona.
11 Cortina, A. (1997). Ética aplicada y democracia radical, Tecnos, Madrid.
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Hobbes, Bentham and Locke, from where C. B Macpherson found argu-
ments to refer to liberalism as a theory of the possessive individualism, 
given the existing coincidences between the traits of these authors and the 
idea that the right to health is a personal responsibility and duty.
According to Macpherson, liberal doctrine conceives individuals as 
free beings who believe they own themselves and their capacities. Hence, 
the idea that individual interest is prior to that belonging to a State or 
society. The free human being is the one who is able to act according to 
his own interests, regardless of any alien will, and who is also able to 
deal with other persons through contractual and mercantile relationships, 
which he willingly joins. According to Macpherson, this concept is the 
basis of liberal societies and the one that originated a possessive mercan-
tile society where competitive and hostile relationships between persons 
are to be found. Relations in which, the key point is that everyone takes 
care of what they own. According to this perspective, society is re-
garded as a space to exchange relations between owners, as a device 
prepared to protect ownership and maintain duly regulated commercial 
relations.12
It is therefore considered that human beings are all equal because they 
are all concerned by the safeguarding of their freedom and they are all 
against any interference whatsoever in their personal affairs. According 
to Berlin, freedom is understood as negative freedom. Freedom is the area 
where persons are set free from any possible interference affecting their 
decision-making capacities or from any arbitrary intervention by a 
higher power. Freedom is understood as the minimal space human beings 
must enjoy for the free development of their talents. On these grounds, 
a minimal model of State is defended. A State that regulates the conflicts 
between persons but that refrains from intervening in their private lives 
and whose role is generating contracting rules and rules for the regulation 
of the conflicts arising in the middle of the combats for the fulfilment of 
interests.
From this viewpoint, being free is being able to choose without inter-
ferences and threats of arbitrary interferences. According to Berlin this 
is freedom, and we must not link it with the capacities a person may have 
to attain the aims he/she pursues. Being free to choose means being saved 
from any State’s interference. The free human being is the owner of his/
12 Macpherson, C.B. (1979). La teoría política del individualismo posesivo. Fon-
tanella, Barcelona, p. 17, 230.
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her space, he/she is neither coerced nor forced to act in any direction. 
Therefore, it is inaccurate to link freedom with politics. Because “the 
impotence to attain a goal does not mean a lack of political freedom”,13 
and it is not related with it, either. According to Berlin, the means for 
the fulfilment of freedom are not the State’s or the government’s respon-
sibility. In this regard, he states: “If my poverty were a kind of disease, 
which prevented me from buying bread, or paying for the journey round 
the world or getting my case heard, as lameness prevents me from run-
ning, this inability would not naturally be described as a lack of freedom, 
least of all political freedom.”14 According to this view, poverty and 
vulnerability are not considered as a lack of freedom and under the same 
approach, which disconnects the idea of freedom from the capacities that 
a person has in order to attain the aims he/she pursues, the idea that 
health is a matter that every person must attend to, instead of a right that 
the State must guarantee, gains ground.
Nevertheless, as we have already pointed out, liberalism is a doctrine 
worded in many ways and that has evolved over time. Liberals currently 
recognise that a person is not a pre-social being but a socialised being that 
belongs to a social environment on which he is able to think critically.15 
There is a group of liberal authors who gather under the category of 
liberal egalitarianism, being J. Rawls its core reference, who do not share 
the interpretation of the liberal concept of freedom as negative freedom, 
supported by the possessive individualism and also by Berlin.
From the liberal egalitarian approach, Gutmann says, as all liberals, 
that freedom is a prima facie value and the essential concern of all hu-
mankind. She agrees to the definition of J.S. Mill, of freedom as freedom 
to choose, but stressing that “election is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of individual freedom, as the alternatives from which we can 
choose must be reasonable and the elective situation one that facilitates, 
or at least does not strangle our capacities to wish and choose”.16 There-
fore, simply electing does not necessarily mean that one is free. Freedom 
is the possibility to choose among a broad range of action opportunities 
13 Berlin, I. (2001). Dos conceptos de libertad y otros escritos. Alianza Editorial, 
Madrid, p. 48.
14 Ibíd., p. 48.
15 Cortina, A. (1997). Ética aplicada y democracia radical. Tecnos, Madrid, p. 75.
16 Gutmann, A. (1980). Liberal Equality. Cambridge University Press, New York, 
p. 10.
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that are attractive to persons. And the public delimitation of the necessary 
conditions for the fulfilment of freedom is a political matter.17
According to Gutmann, freedom is effective freedom, as it is linked 
to political and economic conditions of life. She states: “It makes sense to 
say that the right to sustenance creates the conditions for freedom and, 
thus, that it increases the freedom for the fulfilment of one’s liberty and 
hence, the human beings’ freedom in front of hunger is a freedom. Free-
dom to choose, or to follow a life plan of one’s own”.18 Under this inter-
pretation, beyond the concerns about the interferences of an arbitrary 
power, being free means, in the first place, having the real possibility to 
choose among a broad range of alternatives that should be attractive. 
Secondly, being free means being able to choose from a rational will, and 
lastly that there are some basic pre-conditions for the fulfilment and the 
extension of the freedom of choosing, these conditions being related to 
the minimum goods that guarantee that persons have the ability to enjoy 
their right to choose and have also the capabilities to participate politi-
cally in the definition of the social and institutional framework where 
they will develop their lives”.19 These conditions consist on access to a 
number of primary goods such as education and health, which are, among 
other goods, necessary conditions for the development of a free life and 
for a person to be able to accomplish the aims he/she pursue. The defend-
ers of the liberal egalitarianism consider that persons are equal in terms 
of dignity and that in a fair society basic freedoms are given for granted 
and that the rights guaranteed by the justice can’t be subjected neither to 
political bargaining nor to the calculation of social interests.20 These should 
be agreed as part of a deliberative process.21
After having seen the disagreements within the liberal theory in rela-
tion to the definition of freedom, it is relevant to emphasize that the 
positions of possessive individualism, some of its premises, the principle 
that human beings are owners of themselves and of their capabilities, or 
17 Gutmann, A. (1993). “Equality”, in Miller, D., (Ed.), The Blackwell Encyclo-
paedia of Political Thought. Blackwell, Oxford, p. 136.
18 Gutmann, A. (1980). Liberal Equality. Cambridge University Press, New York, 
p. 9.
19 Gutmann, A. (1983). “How liberal is democracy” in M.D. Lean, and C. Mills, 
(Comp.), Liberalism reconsidered. Rowman and Allenheld, Totowa N.J., pp. 25-50.
20 Rawls, J. (1997). Teoría de la justicia. F.C.E:, México, p. 39.
21 Gutmann. A. and Thompson, D. (2000). Democracy and Disagreement. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
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the concept that freedom is the only thing that States must ensure to 
citizens, are ideas that support the proposals to reduce welfare State. All 
this reasoning is based on the assumption that the opportunities a person 
may have access to, in order to develop his/her life project are an exclu-
sively personal matter instead of something that must be solved through 
governmental policies.
Another important disagreement within the liberal theory is related 
to the acceptance of an ethical criterion for the distribution of public 
goods. Whilst liberal egalitarians are of the opinion that the criterion to 
assess a distributive policy as fair or unfair is impartiality, the defenders 
of utilitarianism consider that the criterion is the maximisation of the net 
balance of satisfaction. This is a broadly accepted idea in the public dis-
course owing to reasons we will see next.
UTILITY AND COMMON GOOD
Utilitarianism is currently one of the most influencing ethical criteria 
in the elaboration of public policies and the resolution of ethical conflicts. 
It is a wide theory nourished by a great number of contemporary contri-
butions. In this section, our purpose is to explain the basic structure of 
the utilitarian reasoning following the analysis developed by Rawls in the 
Theory of Justice.
Rawls reveals the core ideas of the utilitarian thinking using J.S. Mill 
and Sidwick as his references. It is a teleological theory that states that 
when making decisions we intend to seek our personal interest without 
damaging anyone. In the course of this search of personal satisfaction in 
the promotion of our rational aims and objectives, we usually carry out 
a cost-benefit analysis. We act by weighing both present and future 
losses and profits while looking for a net balance of satisfaction. We try 
to promote our welfare and our wishes throughout life in this manner. 
When promoting our rational aims, we adopt this principle of “rational 
prudence” through which we assess and choose the action that best pro-
motes our welfare.22
22 Utilitarianism describes to a great extent the mental operation we do when mak-
ing personal decisions. However, it is important to remark that ethical theories of 
dialogue have discovered a normative principle that regulates our way of thinking. 
Each time that we argue reasonably we are thinking of ourselves as individuals belong-
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For Rawls, however, the problem of utilitarianism is that it assumes 
that what is rational for an individual person is also rational for a human 
association, therefore transferring the mechanism for the calculation of 
the net balance of satisfaction to the entire society. The question –what 
must be done?– is answered by saying that the wishes of the entire society, 
which is the sum of the wishes of its members, must be accomplished. 
The decision-making process consists of balancing present and future 
profits with present and future losses, with a view to balance satisfactions 
and non-satisfactions between different persons and to obtain as much 
satisfaction as possible. Group welfare is considered to be promoted though 
this approach. Therefore, what is described as fair is maximising the net 
balance of social satisfaction, or, in Rawls’ words, society is well organised 
if its institutions maximise the net balance of satisfaction.23
Rawls considers this operation erroneous for a number of reasons. 
First, because whem the aim is to achieve maximum utility, the analysis 
of the origin and quality of the wishes that are to be maximised is put 
aside, so that all kinds of aims and values are secondary to this primary 
objective. Distinctions are not made between preferences since the only 
concern is to know how satisfaction affects the total welfare. Gutmann 
and Thompson make a good practical analysis of the effects of the one-side 
implementation of the utilitarian criterion looking at what happened in 
the State of Arizona.
The State of Arizona decided to eliminate the financing of liver trans-
plantations in the public health budget because of their high cost and 
because the money saved would be devoted to finance pre-birth care for 
pregnant women. This latter treatment would benefit a higher number 
ing to a community to which we report our actions and elections. This ideal com-
munity is a contra facto and a priori assumption that is present in every argumentation. 
Cf. Habermas. J. (1985), Conciencia moral y acción comunicativa, Península, Barce-
lona, y Apel, K. O. (1985), “El a priori de la comunidad de comunicación y los fun-
damentos de la ética”, in La transformación de la filosofía, Tomo II, Taurus, Madrid, 
pp. 341-413. This discovery has important ethical implications for the argumentative 
logic of utilitarianism, without denying that people actually try to promote their ra-
tional desires, in the context of the community they are part of. Cf. Gallego, D. (2006) 
“La Crisis del Ideal Ilustrado y el Nuevo Rol de la Filosofía en su Relación con las 
Ciencias Humanas. La apuesta de Karl Otto Apel por un principio de complementa-
riedad entre la hermenéutica y la filosofía ilustrada”, in FERMENTUM, Revista del 
Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Humanas de la Facultad de Humanidades 
de la Universidad de los Andes, año 16, N.º 47, pp. 697-722.
23 Rawls, J. (1997). Teoría de la justicia. F.C.E:, México.
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of persons than the former. This decision would provide a higher rate of 
social satisfaction. It was thought that the persons applying for a liver 
transplantation could go to private health services to cover such need. 
The rationale for this decision was called the “Titanic concept of medi-
cine”, which meant that given limited resources for health care, the State 
should support prenatal and paediatric care, which produce the greatest 
long-term gains for women and children.24
This decision reached the public opinion and generated a passionate 
debate, particularly when a citizen of Arizona, Diana Brown, died because 
of a lack of means to afford a liver transplantation. Gutmann and Thomp-
son use this example in order to stress the deficiencies of the utilitarian 
criterion, in its inability to establish distinctions and limitations between 
the different kinds of needs. The core problem was clearly described by 
Rawls when stressing that the strong deficiency of utilitarianism lays on 
considering that what is fair is the maximisation of what is good, when 
goodness and fairness are not the same thing, but different dimensions of 
moral. We assess what is good in relation to ourselves and to our project 
of personal fulfilment, whilst what is fair is defined through an impartial 
dialogue which praises and respects the dignity and the inviolability 
founded in justice for everyone. This is the reason why Rawls thinks that 
it is neither reasonable to regard the principle of the individual election 
as principle of justice nor it is valid to attack personal dignity or freedom 
because a higher good is shared by other persons.
Gutmann and Thompson share the idea of not subjecting the basic 
liberties ensured by justice to political bargaining nor to the calculation 
of social interest. For them, the application of utility criteria in the case 
of the liver transplantations is not valid since it does not set a limit for 
freedom and equality of opportunities. From a moral point of view it is 
not possible to distribute health expenditure harming the right to life and 
for both these authors and for Rawls, the limits to the application of the 
utility criteria are the respect for freedom and the equality of opportu-
nity.
According to Rawls, utilitarianism takes into account the demands of 
justice and recognition of persons’ dignity but considers both of them as 
secondary to the principle of social utility. Utilitarianism takes such 
values into account because in civilised societies they are highly wished 
24 Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D., (2000). Democracy and Disagreement. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp. 213-223.
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and praised principles, so they must be considered when calculating the 
net balance of satisfaction.
Rawls’ theory of justice is one of the ethical proposals included in what 
is being called ethics of dialogue. These proposals defend that the indi-
vidual election criterion, which intends to balance present and future 
satisfactions and losses, cannot be extended to the entire society and be 
used as a criterion of justice, since what people consider convenient for 
their life depends on their own assessment of what is good for them, but 
what is good for society can only be decided through a rational dialogue 
with impartial conditions, where the equality and dignity of all participants 
is recognised from the beginning. This deliberative criterion is based on 
a decision-making procedure.
DELIBERATION AS A DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The core trait of the approach in dialogic ethics, also known as delib-
erative or communicative ethics, is the fact that it considers dialogue as 
the key priority in decision-making processes. It considers that the ap-
proach based on the calculations of costs and benefits ignores the rational-
ity analysis and the moral contents of the wishes and satisfactions of the 
majority, thus risking a threat to the fundamental rights of those affected 
by such decisions. We must emphasize that the deliberative procedure is 
not a sort of dialogue, it is not a place for meeting and simply talking or 
adding preferences, but a space where it is possible to deliberate and discuss 
about the demands of all those affected by a decision, where alternatives 
that can be accepted as reasonable might emerge.
This means that when assigning scarce resources, the fairness of deci-
sions will depend on the criteria for distribution deriving from an argu-
mentative process, where the voices of those affected by such decisions 
are heard and their views considered. The deliberative process becomes 
an essential part of the fairness-generating process. This was already rec-
ognised in ancient times by Aristotle, who stated that “...each isolated 
individual is imperfect to judge”, when we are considering matters re-
lated to public well-being.25 This complication cannot be solved by having 
experts in decision-making participating in the processes, since being a 
25 Aristóteles, La política, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1983, 
Libro III, 11, 1281b, 88.
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specialist has nothing to do with deciding what affects my own life and 
vital opportunities. When wondering about the role of experts in the 
political construction of justice, Aristotle himself warned that “...know-
ing about a house does not only concern its builder, as the one who uses 
it is best positioned to judge about it (and the person who uses it is its 
owner)...”.26 A well organized dialogue allows problems related with 
scarcity of resources, moral disagreements and other varied forms of 
moral conflicts arising in society to be satisfactorily approached.27
In general terms, the deliberative procedure for decision-making pro-
cesses considers that it is essential to comply with the following require-
ments:
• Guaranteeing the participation of all those affected by the decision 
or their representatives.
• Those taking part in the deliberative process must be able to express 
themselves in conditions of freedom and equity.
• Practising respect, recognition and reciprocity in the deliberative 
processes. This conveys people treating each other with the due 
recognition and dignity.
• Any demand must be rationally justified and worded in such a way 
that is understandable to all participants in the deliberative process.
• People must put forward their demands from the viewpoint of the 
general interest since any decision against the fundamental rights of 
others will not be accepted.
When conducted in these terms, deliberations: 1) allow to distinguish 
between what is moral, immoral and amoral and to reduce the distances 
between extreme positions, leading to an economy of moral disagreement;28 
2) contributes to interpreting mistakes correctly, to acquire knowledge 
on the situation of others, it encourages mutual understanding and im-
proves collective self-understanding. People think about their initial posi-
tions and end up contributing to a common will while being able to 
26 Ibíd., Libro III, 11, 1282a, 89.
27 On the sources of moral disagreement and the deliberative process as conflict 
resolution criterion I have reflected on Arenas-Dolz, F. y Gallegos, D., (Eds.), (2009), 
El ciudadano democrático: reflexiones éticas para una educación intercultural. Plaza 
y Valdez, Madrid, pp. 75-96.
28 Cf. Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2000). Democracy and Disagreement. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts.
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justify consistently and rationally their options and decisions;29 3) and 
generates mutually justifiable and therefore legitimate decisions since it 
only considers arguments and criteria that can be accepted by all those 
affected in the framework of a rational dialogue.
Nevertheless, within deliberative approaches there are relevant nu-
ances in terms of how the notion of deliberative ethics application is in-
terpreted. In this regard, Conill distinguishes two types of methodologi-
cal proposals, the pragmatic and the hermeneutic.30 The first model relates 
to proposals of liberal egalitarianism advocated by Rawls, Gutmann and 
Thompson, and the second to the deliberative proposals supported by 
the author himself, Cortina, Martínez and Siurana among others.31 Both 
methods describe deliberation as a circular process which begins and ends 
in a deliberative context.
The most pragmatic models approach conflicts on the basis of values 
considered to be in force within the society where deliberation takes place, 
but they do not provide rules or ideas that serve as a reference. What 
would happen if society demanded a deliberation without including all 
those affected by the decision? Such approaches lack unconditioned rules 
or premises, when compared to negotiations in deliberative processes. 
On top of that they leave us without any reliable reference. Conill states 
that if deliberation does not want to go adrift and give way to pragmatic 
criteria, it must have the capacity to relate to some criterion of validity.
Contrary to pragmatics, critical hermeneutics intend to provide a 
normative critical criterion that does not renounce to the hermeneutic 
understanding of society, but provides a normative reference that intel-
ligently guides the sense of action. The regulatory ethical principle of 
deliberation is the principle of discursive ethics that introduces the notion 
of human beings as valid interlocutors. This principle states that “the 
29 Cf. Cortina, A. (2010). “Communicative Democracy: A Version of Deliberative 
Democracy”, in Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie, Franz Steiner, Vol. 96., 
Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D., (2000). Democracy and Disagreement, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts; Elster, J, (2001). “Introducción”, in Elster, 
J., (Comp.), La democracia deliberativa, Gedisa, Barcelona, pp. 13-33.
30 Conill, J. (2003). “El carácter hermenéutico y deliberativo de las éticas aplicadas”, 
in Cortina, A. and García-Marzá, D., (Eds.), Razón pública y éticas aplicadas. Tec-
nos, Madrid, pp. 121-142.
31 Cortina, A. and Martínez, E., (1998). Ética. Akal, Madrid. Siurana, J. C., (2003), 
Una brújula para la vida moral, Granada, Comares. Siurana, J.C. (2009), La sociedad 
ética. Indicadores para evaluar éticamente una sociedad, Proteus, Barcelona.
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valid norms are those (and only those) that can be accepted by all those 
affected by them as participants in rational discourses”.32 This principle 
that regulates the dialogue becomes an unconditioned demand of the 
mutual recognition of personal autonomy. It is a universal principle, as 
it is based on the transcendental foundations of the intersubjective com-
munication, which has been described by Habermas, Apel, Cortina and 
Conill.
This rule has a formal and a procedural nature, because it allows a 
number of criteria of rationality to be joined in decision-making pro-
cesses, provided that they are accepted by all the participants in the process 
within a rational dialogue. This is important because the utility criterion 
is not discarded, on the contrary, it is required to be adopted in the 
framework of a previous dialogue where all affected parties participate in 
order to guarantee that no minorities are compelled to renounce to their 
fundamental freedoms and rights.
The critical hermeneutics method enables the application of the delib-
eration to each of the social spheres, while having in mind the objectives 
that each area pursues. According to this perspective, the deliberation 
must take into account three moments:
1. A deontological Kantian moment, which considers that the ethical 
principle from which all deliberation arises is the recognition of 
each person as a valid partner and therefore as a legitimate partici-
pant in the decision-making processes.
2. An Aristotelic moment. In the framework of deliberation we must 
consider the objectives according to which social activity makes 
sense. In the case of medicine the objectives, values and virtues of 
the activity are clear. This enables decision-making processes to 
have a reference guiding the direction the deliberation must take.
3. The moment to reconsider before decisions are made. It is impor-
tant to be acquainted with the data, the limitations, the alternatives 
that are at stake and the effects that each may have.
This deliberative method has the advantage of allowing a number of 
criteria in terms of decision-making to be incorporated, provided that 
they are accepted in a framework of a rational dialogue among all the 
participants in the process. This is important because the inclusion of the 
32 Cortina, A. (1997). Ética aplicada y democracia radical. Tecnos, Madrid.
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utility criterion is not ruled out, even though it is required that when 
applied, it must always be done in a context of previous dialogue where 
those affected take part in order to guarantee that they are not forced to 
relinquish their fundamental liberties and freedoms.
CONCLUSIONS
The rationalization of the public health system must be done by guar-
anteeing that the National Health System and medicine itself can con-
tinue complying with the objectives that make both of them meaningful. 
If rationalizing is only understood as saving money, the measures allow-
ing this institution to continue meeting its objectives will never be taken. 
These core objectives are related with ensuring the fairness and quality 
of public health.
The deliberative process enables to approach the problem of the scar-
city of resources taking into account both the rights of the persons af-
fected and the aims of medicine. The requirements for a healthy delib-
eration become a guarantee that the decisions made will not cause un-
necessary harm and that it will be possible to accept them from the 
viewpoint of reciprocity. It means that such decisions will be reasonable 
so any person finding himself/herself in a similar situation will consider 
them as valid and it will also be possible to defend publicly the reasons 
leading to such decisions.
In short, the deliberative criterion guarantees the respect and promo-
tion of human beings basic rights, which is essential for the continuity of 
order, social peace and prosperity. Social exclusion generates injustice 
while deep inequality generates violence and instability. We are respon-
sible for surveying that in the management of scarce health resources 
democratic procedures are adopted. There is an increasing awareness of 
the worthy and necessary values that must be defended in order to guar-
antee a long-term sustainability of the social order we have built. The 
deliberative procedure has broad possibilities to be implemented in civil 
society and public institutions through mediating ethical bodies and a set 
of tools that may contribute to making decisions that are recognized as 
fair and legitimated in our current complex and plural societies.
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   140 26/07/13   08:31
141GALLEGO
RATIONALISATION OF THE EXPENDITURE AND THE RIGHT 
TO HEALTHCARE. MIGRANTS AND THE FAIRNESS OF HEALTH REFORM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristóteles. La política, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 
1983.
Apel, K.O. (1985). “El a priori de la comunidad de comunicación y los 
fundamentos de la ética”, in La transformación de la filosofía, Tomo 
II, Taurus, Madrid, pp. 341-413.
Berlin, I., (2001). Dos conceptos de libertad y otros escritos. Alianza 
Editorial, Madrid.
Conill, J. (2003). “El carácter hermenéutico y deliberativo de las éticas 
aplicadas” in Cortina, A. and García-Marzá, D., (Eds.), Razón 
pública y éticas aplicadas. Tecnos, Madrid, pp. 121-142.
Cortina, A. (1997). Ética aplicada y democracia radical. Tecnos, Madrid.
— (2010),“Communicative Democracy: A Version of Deliberative De-
mocracy”, in Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie, Franz Steiner, 
Vol. 96.
Cortina, A. y Martínez, E. Ética. Akal, Madrid, 1998.
Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, http://www.un.org/es/
documents/udhr/
Directiva 2011/24/UE Del Parlamento Europeo y Del Consejo de 09 
de marzo de 2011, relativa a la aplicación de los derechos de los paci-
entes ante la asistencia sanitaria transfronteriza.
Elster, J., (2001). “Introducción”, in Elster, J.,(Comp.), La democracia 
deliberativa. Gedisa, Barcelona, pp. 13-33.
Gallegos, D. (2009). “Educar en la deliberación”, in Arenas-Dolz, F. and 
Gallegos, D., (Eds.), El ciudadano democrático: reflexiones éticas 
para una educación intercultural. Plaza y Valdez, Madrid, pp. 75-96.
— (2011) Guía Metodológica. De los tópicos a la realidad. Proced-
imientos de actuación frente a prejuicios relativos a la diversidad 
de origen. Fundación Cepaim. http://cepaim.org/biblioteca/publi-
caciones-2/
— (2006) “La Crisis del Ideal Ilustrado y el Nuevo Rol de la Filosofía en 
su Relación con las Ciencias Humanas. La apuesta de Karl Otto Apel 
por un principio de complementariedad entre la hermenéutica y la 
filosofía ilustrada”, in FERMENTUM, Revista del Centro de Inves-
tigaciones en Ciencias Humanas de la Facultad de Humanidades 
de la Universidad de los Andes, año 16, Nº 47, pp. 697-722.
Gutmann, A. (1980). Liberal equality, Liberal equality. Cambridge 
University Press, New York.
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   141 26/07/13   08:31
142 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2013. ISSUE 4 PP. 123-142
— (1993) “Equality”, in Miller, D., (Ed.), The Blackwell Enciclopedia 
of Political Thought. Blackwell, Oxford.
Gutmann, A., “How liberal is democracy” in M.D. Lean and C. Mills, 
(Coomp.), Liberalism reconsidered. Rowman and Allenheld, Totowa 
N.J., 1983, pp. 25-50.
Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2000). Democracy and Disagreement. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Habermas, J. (2005). Facticidad y Validez. Trotta, Madrid.
—(1985), Conciencia moral y acción comunicativa. Península, Barce-
lona.
Hastings Center. (2007). Los fines de la medicina. Fundació Víctor 
Grífols i Lucas, Barcelona.
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2010), Notas de prensa, 29/04/2010 
y 28/01/2010. www.ine.es
Ley 16/2003, de 28 de Mayo, de Cohesión y Calidad del Sistema Nacio-
nal de Salud. BOE Nº 128.
Macpherson, C.B. (1979). La teoría política del individualismo posesivo. 
Fontanella, Barcelona.
McIntyre, A. (2004). Tras la virtud. Crítica, Barcelona.
Moreno, F.J. and Bruquetas M. (2011). Inmigración y Estado de Bien-
estar en España, Colección Estudios Sociales, Nº 31, Obra Social 
“La Caixa”, Barcelona.
Rawls, J., (1997). Teoría de la justicia. F.C.E., México.
Real Decreto-ley 16/2012 de 20 de abril, de medidas urgentes para ga-
rantizar la sostenibilidad del Sistema Nacional de Salud y mejorar la 
calidad y seguridad de sus prestaciones. BOE, Nº 98.
Siurana, J. C., (2003). Una brújula para la vida moral. Granada, Comares.





This paper was received on December 15, 2012 and was approved on 
January 20, 2013.
Ramon Llull Journal_04_2013.indd   142 26/07/13   08:31
